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The Differential Treatment of
Adolescents as a Principle of
Fundamental Justice: An Analysis of
R. v. B. (D.) and C. (A.) v. Manitoba
Cheryl L. Milne*

I. INTRODUCTION
This paper began as a reflection on the Supreme Court of Canada‟s
decision in R. v. B. (D.),1 in particular its finding that a presumption of
reduced moral blameworthiness for adolescents was a principle of
fundamental justice under section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms2 in the context of Canada‟s youth criminal justice system.
The discussion points raised by the Court‟s characterization of
adolescence, or the “constitutionalization of adolescence” as Professor
Nicholas Bala describes it,3 included at the time the nature of the criteria
established by the Court as to what constitutes a principle of fundamental
justice, as well as concern about the implications of the decision on a
pending case which also focused on the nature of adolescent decisionmaking in the child health and welfare context: C. (A.) v. Manitoba
(Director of Child and Family Services).4 This paper now expands upon
those initial comments by following upon the release of the Court‟s
decision in C. (A.) v. Manitoba and addresses the evidentiary aspects of
the Court‟s judicial notice of the psychological underpinnings of its
*
LL.B., M.S.W., Executive Director of the David Asper Centre for Constitutional Rights,
Faculty of Law, University of Toronto and counsel for the intervenor Justice for Children and Youth
in both R. v. B. (D.) and C. (A.) v. Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services). This is an
updated version of a presentation at the Annual Constitutional Law Conference of Osgoode Hall
Law School, April 17, 2009.
1
[2008] S.C.J. No. 25, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.).
2
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
3
Nicholas Bala, “R. v. B. (D.): The Constitutionalization of Adolescence” (2009) 47
S.C.L.R. (2d) 211.
4
[2009] S.C.J. No. 30, 2009 SCC 30 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “C. (A.) v. Manitoba”].
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decision in both cases in addition to an analysis of how the Court applies
the criteria to establish what is a principle of fundamental justice in these
two cases. Ultimately, both cases establish a relatively consistent view of
adolescence as a trajectory toward adulthood, but not quite there yet, and
limits autonomous rights and adult responsibility accordingly. Arguably,
the Court is less consistent in its application of the legal rules to arrive at
this conclusion.

II. STATUTORY TREATMENT OF YOUNG PEOPLE AS ADULTS
The Canadian criminal justice system‟s response to young people
who commit the most serious violent offences has always allowed for the
treatment of some young people as adults, either in the trial proceedings
or in sentencing. The age at which adult treatment has been applicable
has fluctuated over the years, but the availability of life sentences for
murder, for example, has always been part of the juvenile justice system.
In the past youth have been subjected to both a trial in the adult system
as well as the possibility of an adult sentence. Under the Juvenile
Delinquents Act,5 young people were treated like adults automatically at
age 16 with the possibility of such treatment at age 14. Under the Young
Offenders Act,6 youth aged 16 and older could be subjected to an adult
trial.
The Youth Criminal Justice Act,7 enacted to replace the YOA,
established a new procedure for the treatment of young offenders as
adults in the case of specified serious criminal offences. Whereas under
the YOA the young person was subjected to a transfer hearing prior to
trial to determine whether he or she would be tried in adult court, under
the YCJA the determination takes place following the trial in youth court
and, therefore, on the basis of a finding of guilt.8 The YCJA also
established a presumption in favour of adult sentences for young people
14 years or older for certain violent offences, called presumptive
offences. The offences include murder, attempted murder, manslaughter,
aggravated sexual assault and a third conviction for a serious violent
offence (“three strikes”).9 It is up to the young person to seek a youth
sentence in those circumstances.
5
6
7
8
9

R.S.C. 1970, c. J-3.
R.S.C. 1985, c. Y-1 [hereinafter “YOA”].
S.C. 2002, c. 1 [hereinafter “YCJA”].
Id., s. 71.
Id., s. 2(1).
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The various transfer provisions of the previous legislation were
subjected to Supreme Court scrutiny, but had never been subjected to a
challenge under the Charter. In R. v. M. (S.H.),10 the Court examined the
nature of the onus on a party seeking transfer to an adult court under the
YOA. No Charter issues were raised, and McLachlin J. (as she then was)
held that it was not a heavy burden on the Crown. Thus, when the
government of Quebec brought a reference to the Quebec Court of
Appeal on the constitutionality of the new provisions of the YCJA that
Court was not bound by earlier precedent in respect of the treatment of
youth as adults in our criminal justice system. 11 The Court struck down
the provision, finding that it breached the young person‟s rights under
section 7 of the Charter contrary to the principles of fundamental justice
that it defined as follows:
Young offenders must be dealt with separately from adults;
Rehabilitation, rather than suppression and dissuasion, must be at the
heart of legislative and judicial intervention with young persons;
The justice system for minors must limit the disclosure of the minor‟s
identity so as to prevent stigmatization that can limit rehabilitation;
It is imperative that the justice system for minors consider the best
interests of the child.12

The federal government chose not to appeal this decision, announcing
that it intended to amend the legislation to align it appropriately with the
Charter.13 This was never done, and the constitutionality of these sections
of the YCJA remained live issues in the other provinces. In Ontario, the
case of R. v. B. (D.) was the first to address the issue and essentially
followed the reasoning of the Quebec Court of Appeal. However, there
had been intervening decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada as to the
definition of a principle of fundamental justice and more importantly as
to the finding that the legal principle of the “best interests of the child”
was not such a principle.14 Following on the heels of R. v. B. (D.) was R.
10

[1989] S.C.J. No. 93, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 446 (S.C.C.).
Reference re Bill C-7 respecting the criminal justice system for young persons, [2003]
Q.J. No. 2850, 175 C.C.C. (3d) 321 (Que. C.A.) [hereinafter “Quebec Reference”].
12
Id., at para. 215.
13
37th Parliament, Official Report of Debates (Hansard) 100 (May 12, 2003), at 1450
(Hon. Martin Cauchon).
14
R. v. Malmo-Levine; R. v. Caine, [2003] S.C.J. No. 79, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Malmo-Levine”]; Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada
(Attorney General), [2004] S.C.J. No. 6, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 76 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Canadian
Foundation”].
11
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v. T. (K.D.),15 a decision in British Columbia which came to opposite
conclusions. In Ontario the Attorney General appealed the decision to the
Supreme Court of Canada to finally obtain clarity in the law, something
that the federal Department of Justice had neglected to do in the Quebec
Reference case.

III. R. V. B. (D.)
D.B. was 17 years old at the time of the incident that resulted in his
being found guilty of manslaughter. In what appeared to be an
unprovoked attack, D.B. punched R. and knocked him unconscious. By
the time paramedics arrived R. had no vital signs and D.B. had fled the
scene. He was arrested the following morning at a friend‟s house. He
pleaded guilty to manslaughter, a “presumptive offence”, and challenged
the constitutionality of the “onus provisions” in the presumptive offences
regime relying upon the reasoning of the Quebec Court of Appeal in
Quebec Reference. The trial judge allowed the challenge on the same
grounds as the Quebec Court of Appeal and sentenced D.B. to the
maximum youth sentence that included an intensive rehabilitative
custody and supervision order for a period of three years.
The Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the decision but being bound by
the Supreme Court‟s decision in Canadian Foundation for Children,
Youth and the Law v. Canada (Attorney General),16 held that the best
interests test was not a principle of fundamental justice.17 Instead the
Court found the presumption was contrary to the principle of fundamental
justice that young offenders should be dealt with separately and not as
adults (one of the principles enunciated by the Quebec Court of Appeal)
as well as the principle that the Crown must bear the burden of proving
aggravating factors in seeking a harsher sentence for the accused.18 The
Ontario Attorney General appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.
In a split decision, the Supreme Court of Canada also struck down
the provisions on the basis that they infringed the young person‟s rights
under section 7 of the Charter. However, the Court, unanimous on this
point, found that the applicable principle of fundamental justice was not
as was found by either the Quebec Court of Appeal or the Ontario Court
15
16
17
18

[2006] B.C.J. No. 253, 37 C.R. (6th) 243 (B.C.C.A.).
Supra, note 14.
R. v. B. (D.), [2006] O.J. No. 1112, 79 O.R. (3d) 698 (Ont. C.A.).
Id., at paras. 55, 63.

(2009), 47 S.C.L.R. (2d) DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF ADOLESCENTS

239

of Appeal, i.e., neither the best interests principle nor the presumption of
separate treatment. Rather, Abella J. described the principle as the
entitlement of youth to a “presumption of reduced moral blameworthiness”
or “culpability” flowing from their heightened vulnerability, lesser
maturity and reduced capacity for moral judgment.19 Justice Rothstein
for the minority concurred on this point but held that the principle was
not breached by the legislation.20 It should be noted that none of the
parties to the appeal argued that this was the principle at stake. The
Appellant Attorney General had argued that it was a principle of
fundamental justice that any person is entitled to recognition of his or her
reduced maturity based upon age.21 The Respondent, D.B., supported the
reasoning of the court below.22

IV. APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES OF FUNDAMENTAL JUSTICE
In rejecting the Quebec Court of Appeal‟s conclusions, the Supreme
Court (as well as the Court of Appeal) followed the reasoning in
Canadian Foundation23 that applied the following criteria in MalmoLevine24 for assessing whether a legal principle is a principle of
fundamental justice:
(1) It must be a legal principle.
(2) There must be a consensus that the rule or principle is fundamental
to the way in which the legal system ought fairly to operate
[central to our societal notion of justice].
(3) It must be identified with sufficient precision to yield a
manageable standard against which to measure deprivations of life,
liberty or security of the person.25

In Canadian Foundation the Court determined that the principle of
the best interests of the child failed to pass muster on the aspect of the
test that required that it be central to our societal notion of justice. It also
19
Supra, note 1, at para. 41. Justice Abella also concluded that the presumption of adult
sentencing breached another, non-youth justice oriented principle of fundamental justice that the
Crown must bear the burden of demonstrating the factors that support the need for a harsher
sentence. This conclusion was disputed by Rothstein J. in his dissent.
20
Id., at para. 106.
21
Factum of the Appellant, Attorney General of Ontario, filed in R. v. B. (D.) (June 1, 2007).
22
Factum of the Respondent, D.B., filed in R. v. B. (D.) (March 23, 2007).
23
Supra, note 14.
24
Id.
25
Supra, note 1, at para. 46.
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lacked sufficient precision, due to its contextual nature, to meet the test.
In R. v. B. (D.) the Court also rejected the notion that the presumption of
a separate youth justice system was such a principle and instead reasoned
that it was the rationale for such a system that was in fact the guiding
legal principle.
In reaching the latter conclusion, Abella J. notes that “it is widely
acknowledged that age plays a role in the development of judgment and
moral sophistication”.26 She cites legal scholars on sentencing and youth
justice, as well as at least one text that summarizes the social science
literature, for the “reality of reduced moral culpability on the part of
young people”.27 Thus the principle she enunciates, the presumption of
diminished moral blameworthiness, meets the second prong of the
Malmo-Levine test according to her reasoning:
The preceding confirms, in my view, that a broad consensus reflecting
society‟s values and interests exists, namely that the principle of a
presumption of diminished moral culpability in young persons is
fundamental to our notions of how a fair legal system ought to
operate.28

Her comments in respect of the third prong of the test illustrate the
difficulty with the Malmo-Levine test which presumes more precision in
general legal principles than is often demonstrable. Justice Abella‟s
reasoning here comes very close to saying that a principle is deemed to
be sufficiently precise simply because the Court says so:
The third criterion for recognition as a principle of fundamental justice
is that the principle be identified with sufficient precision to yield a
manageable standard against which to measure deprivations of life,
liberty or security of the person. This is not a difficult criterion to
satisfy in this case. The principle that young people are entitled to a
presumption of diminished moral culpability throughout any proceedings
against them, including during sentencing, is readily administrable and
sufficiently precise to yield a manageable standard. It is, in fact, a
principle that has been administered and applied to proceedings against
young people for decades in this country. 29

Justice Rothstein in his dissenting reasons, in fact, reveals the lack of
precision inherent in the principle. Although he concurs in the finding
26
27
28
29

Id., at para. 62.
Id., at paras. 62-67.
Id., at para. 68.
Id., at para. 69.
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that a presumption of reduced moral blameworthiness of adolescents is a
principle of fundamental justice, he takes issue with the meaning he
attributes to the principle within the majority‟s reasoning. He asks, “is a
presumption of lower sentences for young offenders a necessary attribute
of this presumption of reduced moral blameworthiness?”30 While he does
not state that the majority would go this far, he does interpret Abella J.‟s
reasoning as dictating a presumption of “youth sentences”. Finding that
this is the problematic conclusion of Abella J.‟s reasoning, he would find
otherwise and hold that affording the young person the ability to apply
for a youth sentence is sufficient to meet the presumption.

V. WHAT DOES REDUCED MORAL BLAMEWORTHINESS MEAN?
Moral blameworthiness is considered an essential element of both
the criminal offence, in respect of the commission of the offence, and the
quantum of sentence. The Court stated in R. v. Ruzic, a case that
examined the defence of duress, that it has “recognized on a number of
occasions that „moral blameworthiness‟ is an essential component of
criminal liability”.31 However, in commenting on the concept of “blamelessness”, the Court expressed caution in introducing such uncertainty
into the law:
The undefinable and potentially far-reaching nature of the concept of
moral blamelessness prevents us from recognizing its relevance beyond
an initial finding of guilt in the context of s. 7 of the Charter. Holding
otherwise would inject an unacceptable degree of uncertainty into the
law. It would not be consistent with our duty to consider as “principles
of fundamental justice” only those concepts which are constrained and
capable of being defined with reasonable precision. I would therefore
reject this basis for finding that it is a principle of fundamental justice
that morally involuntary acts should not be punished. 32

Professor Martha Shaffer, cited in R. v. Ruzic, noted the ambiguity
surrounding the notion of moral blameworthiness in an article focusing
on moral involuntariness and the defence of duress, stating:
While the Supreme Court of Canada has invoked the concept liberally
throughout its s. 7 jurisprudence, it has never discussed the meaning of
moral blameworthiness in any comprehensive way. As a result, it is not
30
31
32

Id., at para. 126.
[2001] S.C.J. No. 25, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 687, at para. 32 (S.C.C.).
Id., at para. 41.
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clear whether the court views moral blameworthiness as restricted to
questions regarding the fault element of offences — generally whether
the mental element of an offence is constitutionally adequate — or
whether the court‟s conception would also encompass issues arising
after the constitutionally required fault element is determined. 33

Regardless of the ambiguity expressed in these contexts, moral
blameworthiness is most often considered to play a part in the sentencing
stage of proceedings. As Lamer C.J.C. held in R. v. M. (C.A.): “It is a
well-established tenet of our criminal law that the quantum of sentence
imposed should be broadly commensurate with the gravity of the offence
committed and the moral blameworthiness of the offender.”34 In MalmoLevine, Arbour J., in dissent, states, “It is a fundamental principle of
sentencing that both the severity of the offence and the moral blameworthiness of the offender should dictate the quantum of sentence.”35
Thus, it follows that a presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness
must equate with a presumption of a lesser sentence. However, even on
this point Abella J. equivocates somewhat in R. v. B. (D.) and states,
“[t]his does not make young persons less accountable for serious
offences; it makes them differently accountable.”36

VI. SOCIAL SCIENCE SUPPORT FOR THE LEGAL PRINCIPLE OF
REDUCED MORAL CULPABILITY
Although the concept of moral blameworthiness within the criminal
law context is clearly part of the legal principles governing sentencing, as
set out above, the principle, as defined by Abella J., of a “presumption of
diminished moral culpability” has attributes of a psychological conclusion
specifically applicable to adolescence. Arguably it is only supportable to
the extent that the science of developmental psychology supports it. If
the studies were to show that all adolescents reach rational and
psychosocial maturity by age 13, for example, the presumption would
fail. Without stating so clearly, the Court takes judicial notice precisely
of the fact that the evidence supports the presumption and, in effect,
helps to define it. Citing primarily legal commentators, Abella J. draws
her conclusions as to age and the development of judgment and moral
Martha Shaffer, “Scrutinizing Duress: The Constitutional Validity of Section 17 of the
Criminal Code” (1998) 40 C.L.Q. 444, at 453-54.
34
[1996] S.C.J. No. 28, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500, at para. 40 (S.C.C.).
35
Supra, note 14, at para. 234.
36
Supra, note 1, at para. 93 (emphasis in original).
33

(2009), 47 S.C.L.R. (2d) DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF ADOLESCENTS

243

sophistication; but as articulated by the majority of the Court the
conclusions could also be considered somewhat of a simplification of the
developmental psychology that underlies the justification for a separate
youth justice system with enhanced protections and different approaches
at various stages, the principle rejected by the Court.
There are a number of evidentiary aspects to the Court‟s ruling that
warrant discussion of the courts‟ handling of complex social science
evidence in cases such as this one with significant social policy
implications. While it may be that the literature is now sufficiently robust
to unequivocally support the conclusions drawn by the Supreme Court in
respect of the blameworthiness of adolescents, the factual foundation that
would normally be part of the Court record is in essence third hand
conclusions of which the Court takes judicial notice. No evidence was
called at any stage of the proceedings in R. v. B. (D.) as to the current
social science evidence on moral development or adolescent developmental
psychology. The evidence is primarily summarized by Nicholas Bala in
Youth Criminal Justice Law,37 cited heavily in the majority judgment.
Some of the attributes of adolescence that certainly impact on judgment
are accepted without controversy: heightened vulnerability, tendency to
act on impulse, importance of peer influence and tendency to engage in
risky behaviour. However, there is less agreement in the literature in
respect of the Court‟s conclusion in respect of the capacity for moral
judgment. The issue is summarized by Doob and Cesaroni, in Responding
to Youth Crime in Canada, one of the few such authorities cited by the
Court:
One of the mistakes people sometimes make is to assume that the
reason we have a separate justice system for youths is that there is a
belief that youth do not understand that certain acts are morally wrong.
This does not seem to be the case. Very young children are likely to be
able to understand that certain acts are wrong. Few would suggest that
ordinary 11- or 17-year-olds do not understand, almost as well as adults
understand, that either taking something from a store without paying
for it, or stabbing someone, is not morally acceptable. 38

The social science research suggests more subtle differences between
adolescents and adults that nonetheless supports significantly different
37
Nicholas Bala, Youth Criminal Justice Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2003) [hereinafter
“Bala, Youth Criminal Justice Law”].
38
Anthony Doob & Carla Cesaroni, Responding to Youth Crime in Canada (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2004), at 34 [hereinafter “Doob & Cesaroni”].
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responses to criminal behaviour. A more comprehensive review of the
literature was undertaken by the U.S. Supreme Court in Roper v.
Simmons,39 a case not cited in R. v. B. (D.) but clearly touching on the
same conclusions regarding the nature of adolescence and the imposition
of adult penalities. The U.S. Supreme Court relied heavily on the
research conducted by Steinberg and others in its decision striking down
the death penalty for offenders under the age of 18. A significant amount
of research material was provided by way of Brandeis briefs from amicus
curiae such as the American Psychological Association and the
American Psychiatric Association, among numerous others. In a paper
that surveys the social science as of 2003, and was relied upon by the
Court, Steinberg and Scott concluded:
Thus, there is good reason to believe that adolescents, as compared to
adults, are more susceptible to influence, less future oriented, less risk
averse, and less able to manage their impulses and behavior, and that
these differences likely have a neurobiological basis. The important
conclusion for our purposes is that juveniles may have diminished
decision-making capacity compared with adults because of differences
in psychosocial capacities that are likely biological in origin.40

Additional research also supports differential treatment in other
aspects of the youth criminal justice system beyond just sentencing. For
example, research supports the view that the tendency toward
experimentation with risky behaviour during adolescence and the
development of identity through the adolescent years support the
argument that the labelling of young persons as criminal into their
adulthood is unwarranted given the often transitory nature of adolescent
offending behaviour.41 Doob and Cesaroni have noted that the research
demonstrating the lack of understanding that young people generally
have as to the nature of rights, the consequences of waiving their legal
rights, including their right to counsel, as well as their understanding of
the trial process, suggest that “we cannot assume that young people have
sufficient knowledge of the legal system and the criminal law provisions
that govern proceedings in the youth justice system to fully and freely
participate in criminal proceedings against them”.42 It is these more
39

543 U.S. 551, 161 L.Ed. 2d 1 (2005).
L. Steinberg & E. Scott, “Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental
Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty” 58(12) American
Psychologist 1009-1018, at 1013.
41
Id., at 1014.
42
Doob & Cesaroni, supra, note 38, at 36-40.
40
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complex differences that suggest the need for a separate youth justice
system, not just separate youth sentences.43
Arguably, the case of R. v. L. (S.J.)44 moves in that direction in the
reasoning of the majority as to the legality of joint trials of co-accused
adults and young persons. Justice Deschamps, this time speaking for the
majority (although she concurred with Rothstein J. in R. v. B. (D.)),
states:
Finally — and this comment concerns the overall approach to youth
justice — the effect of the objectives of the Act is that the judge is
asked to favour rehabilitation, reintegration and the principle of a fair
and proportionate accountability that is consistent with the young
person‟s reduced level of maturity. As for the adult criminal justice
system, it places greater emphasis on punishment. There is no doubt
that how the judge conducts the trial will reflect these different
objectives. It would be much more difficult to maintain an approach
favourable to a young person if he or she were being tried together with
an adult, and the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness to
which the young person is entitled could be undermined as a result. 45

Thus, her reasoning seems to suggest that the principle of diminished
moral blameworthiness applies to more than simply the sentencing of
young people and affects the entire procedural approach to youth
criminal justice. This is precisely the conclusion that split the Court in R.
v. B. (D.), which really turned on the implications of the principle. Those
implications are at the heart of the second criterion in the Malmo-Levine
test which examines the social acceptance of the principle in the way it
affects how the legal system “ought fairly to operate”.46

VII. SOCIETAL CONSENSUS FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF
FUNDAMENTAL JUSTICE
Despite ostensibly agreeing on the applicable principle of fundamental
justice, the majority and the minority disagree as to the societal consensus
on the appropriate response to youth crime. The differences lie in their
respective approaches to determining societal consensus for the principle
and to balancing competing interests within the section 7 analysis. Once
Anjeev Anand, “Catalyst for Change: The History of Canadian Juvenile Justice Reform”
(1999) 24 Queen‟s L.J. 515-59, at para. 92 [hereinafter “Anand”].
44
[2009] S.C.J. No. 14, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 426 (S.C.C.).
45
Id., at para. 75.
46
Supra, note 14, at para. 113.
43
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again the Court‟s use of evidence outside of the record before the Court
as well as a somewhat selective approach to the analysis of the legislative
history demonstrate the complexities of the issues in the section 7
analysis and, arguably, the limitations of the Malmo-Levine test,
particularly in respect of its requirement of “precision”.
Justice Rothstein points to public calls for harsher penalties for
young people as an indication that societal consensus does not agree with
the conclusions reached by the majority. Citing Doob and Cesaroni, he
notes that “studies on public perceptions of youth crime suggest that the
prevailing views of the public are that youth crime is rising, particularly
violent youth crime, and that young offenders are handled too leniently
by youth justice courts.”47 However, he never addresses the basic
problem with accepting this as societal consensus: the opinions are based
on erroneous assumptions of the facts as to the impact of rehabilitation
and the youth crime rate, and the studies cited suggest more complex
attitudes and assumptions at play, often related to the manner in which
youth crime is covered in the media.48 If misleading media coverage can
skew public sentiment such as to negate by popular opinion a principle of
fundamental justice, does this not call into question the very concept of
the rule of law?
Justice Abella places greater emphasis on the legislative history,
legal precedent, academic commentary and Canada‟s international
obligations to support her conclusion of a broad consensus, essentially
ignoring public sentiment. Justice Rothstein accurately identifies points
in her reasoning of selective analysis of the legislative history in respect
of the treatment of some young people as adults, whereas his own
selective analysis of juvenile justice developments in Canada suggests a
rejection of the child welfare approach of early delinquency legislation in
favour of more accountability by young people. However, it ignores the
fact that the more recent legislation balances this accountability with a
more rights-based approach that was found wanting in the Juvenile
Delinquents Act, which would not likely have withstood Charter scrutiny.49
The differences between the two decisions lay as much in the
definition of the principle of fundamental justice at play, as in how the
47

R. v. B. (D.), supra, note 1, at para. 131.
Jane Sprott, “Understanding Public Views of Youth Crime and the Youth Justice
System” (1996) 38 Can. J. Crim. 271; Jane Sprott, “Understanding Public Opposition to a Separate
Youth Justice System” (1998) 44 Crime & Delinquency 399; Bala, Youth Criminal Justice Law,
supra, note 37, at 14-15.
49
Anand, supra, note 43, at para. 83.
48
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Court should balance the respective rights of the individual young person
with the state interest in protecting the public. Justice Abella‟s judgment
signals a willingness to do the balancing under section 1 of the Charter,
an approach that is consistent with the line of reverse onus cases from the
early 1990s.50 Justice Rothstein clearly takes the opposite approach,
finding that the impugned provisions do not infringe the principle of
fundamental justice enunciated when balanced against the societal
interest of public safety.51
The case is clearly at the fulcrum of the incredible tension in youth
justice policy in this country, between political decisions influenced by
headlines fuelling public sentiments toward retribution and policy
approaches with a rehabilitation focus based upon research and consultation
with experts. The YCJA was carefully designed to attempt to balance the
two competing interests, but according to the majority of the Supreme
Court, weighed too favourably on the side of those seeking a more
retributive form of justice. The case illustrates, in its divisive judgment,
society‟s ambivalent views about adolescents. On the one hand, the
public tends to want to limit rights based upon assumptions as to
decision-making capacity, assumptions that seem to have considerable
scientific support, and on the other hand, to bring the full range of adult
responsibility to bear when young people commit crimes. The Court‟s
subsequent decision in C. (A.) v. Manitoba, again a split decision
focusing on adolescent development, is arguably consistent in its
ambivalent approach to adolescent autonomy.

VIII. C. (A.) V. MANITOBA (DIRECTOR OF CHILD AND
FAMILY SERVICES)
In its long-awaited decision, C. (A.) v. Manitoba (Director of Child
and Family Services),52 Abella J. for the majority of the Supreme Court
rendered a judgment that is consistent with R. v. B. (D.) in its
“constitutionalization” of adolescence. The presumption of reduced
capacity for judgment, in this case as it relates to medical decisionmaking, is preserved by the majority‟s finding that such a presumption
does not infringe a child‟s rights under section 7 to liberty and security of
the person. The “constitutionalization” of adolescence in effect means
50
51
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protecting young people by not treating them as adults and thereby not
affording them adult rights under the Charter.
A.C. had challenged the Manitoba legislation that had been
interpreted by the courts below as providing courts with the power to
order medical treatment contrary to her wishes. A.C., a mature 14-yearold girl, asserted her rights under the Charter to make a religiously
motivated medical decision to refuse a blood transfusion. The treatment
was deemed by the doctors and held by the lower court to be medically
necessary as there was “immediate danger as the minutes go by, if not
[of] death, then certainly [of] serious damage”.53 A.C. suffered from
Crohn‟s disease which caused intestinal bleeding. She had arrived four
days prior to the court hearing at the emergency department of the
hospital, where she was initially stabilized without the need for a
transfusion, but through the night of the third day in the hospital she
appeared to have suffered another bleed and was in serious need of
hemoglobin. She was apprehended and an emergency protection hearing
was convened wherein the Director of Child and Family Services sought
an order under the Manitoba Child and Family Services Act54 for an
order authorizing qualified medical personnel to administer blood
transfusions to A.C. as deemed necessary by the attending physician,
without her consent or that of her parents. It had been argued by
Manitoba that her consent was irrelevant to the court proceedings as the
legislation permitted the court to order the treatment regardless of her
capacity.
The decision of the majority finds that there were no breaches of
A.C.‟s Charter rights under section 2(a), section 7 or section 15.55
However, the fact that A.C. was found to have capacity to make the
decision by psychiatrists who had assessed her, and the argument that
adolescents demonstrate varying degrees of maturity and capacity in
respect of these types of decisions, could not be ignored by the Court.
Instead, Abella J., for the majority, reads into the legal test of the best
interests of the child, the obligation to take into account the child‟s views
and wishes in accordance with his or her evolving capacities. The test is
to be interpreted so that a young person is afforded a degree of bodily
autonomy and integrity commensurate with his or her ability to exercise
53
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mature, independent judgment. In a thoughtful decision that canvasses
much of the literature in regard to adolescent decision-making capacity
(a significant amount of which was not pleaded by the parties),56 Abella
J. grapples with the dilemma presented by a mature young woman who
wishes to make what is presumed to be a bad decision.

IX. ANALYSIS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF FUNDAMENTAL JUSTICE IN
C. (A.) V. MANITOBA
The principle of fundamental justice against which the deprivation of
A.C.‟s liberty and security of the person is measured is that laws should
not be arbitrary. Justice Abella unequivocally states “given the
significance we attach to bodily integrity, it would be arbitary to assume
that no one under the age of 16 has capacity to make medical treatment
decisions”.57 As in R. v. B. (D.) the social science literature is central to
Abella J.‟s analysis of the purported arbitrariness of the law. However, in
this case, the Court took it upon itself to conduct an independent review
of the literature. Under the subheading of academic literature Abella J.
quotes extensively from both commentary and studies into the nature of
decision-making by adolescents and the ability of health practitioners to
assess capacity. Arguably, this goes far beyond the judicial notice taken
of the unique circumstances of adolescence in R. v. B. (D.).
Despite any concerns one might have about the majority‟s independent
fact-finding mission, the conclusions drawn are not particularly controversial
in that they acknowledge the complexity of assessing capacity in
adolescents, thereby requiring an individualized approach:
Clearly the factors that may affect an adolescent‟s ability to exercise
independent, mature judgment in making maximally autonomous
choices are numerous, complex, and difficult to enumerate with any
precision. They include “the individual physical, intellectual and
psychological maturity of the minor, the minor‟s lifestyle … [and] the
nature of the parent-child relationship” (Manitoba Law Reform
Commission, Minors’ Consent to Health Care, p. 32). While it may be
relatively easy to test cognitive competence alone, as the social

56
A review of the secondary sources cited by the majority suggests that only approximately
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scientific literature shows, it will inevitably be a far more challenging
exercise to evaluate the impact of these other types of factors. 58

Ultimately, Abella J. finds that a presumption against capacity for those
under 16 years of age, with a positive obligation to consider the views
and wishes of a particular young person, on a sliding scale of scrutiny
that encompasses both the maturity of the adolescent and the seriousness
of the decision,59 is not an arbitrary violation of the young person‟s
liberty or security of the person. Chief Justice McLachlin, concurring in
the decision, goes further in her support of the law in question and
suggests that using age as a proxy for independence does not infringe the
substantive principle of fundamental justice against arbitrariness. In her
reasons she refers to the majority‟s decision in R. v. B. (D.) as
recognizing “as a principle of fundamental justice that young persons
must generally be treated differently from adults by virtue of their
„reduced maturity and moral capacity‟”,60an arguably broader take on the
majority‟s decision in that case and precisely the principle enunciated by
the Court of Appeal and rejected by the Supreme Court as insufficiently
precise. The criterion for precision in the identification of the principle is
thus shown to be more malleable than one might expect. However
previous decisions have acknowledged flexibility in the interpretation of
other fundamental principles. For example, Iacobucci J. in R. v. S. (R.J.)
stated that “the principle against self-incrimination may mean different
things at different times and in different contexts”.61

X. CONCLUSION
As in R. v. S. (R.J.), the principle of a presumption of diminished
moral culpability has already been shown to have a different meaning,
albeit at the same time and in the same context. The blame may be
attributed to the Court‟s reliance upon the social science evidence to
attempt to establish societal consensus for too narrow a principle. A more
comprehensive review of the literature demonstrates the need for
differential treatment in many aspects of the criminal justice system.
Similar evidence appears to ground the Court‟s section 7 analysis in
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C. (A.) v. Manitoba,62 which in essence, reinterprets the legislation to
maintain its constitutionality.
Arguably the two cases, read together with the Court‟s earlier
decision in Canadian Foundation,63 suggest an entirely distinct reading
of Charter rights for children, a reading that eschews autonomy and
establishes paternalism as a principle of fundamental justice. In R. v. B.
(D.),64 the principle is narrowly construed as a presumption of reduced
moral blameworthiness, which prevents the opposite presumption of
harsher adult sentences. In C. (A.) v. Manitoba, the principle against
arbitrariness is held not to be infringed where there is a presumption of
reduced capacity for decision-making that nonetheless must consider the
young person‟s best interests. In both instances, there is the presumption
against adult-like treatment rebuttable by the individual circumstances of
the adolescent in question, including the nature of the crime committed
or the seriousness of the medical decision to be made. However, it is the
Chief Justice‟s reinterpretation of the principle articulated in R. v. B.
(D.), along with Deschamps J.‟s similar expansive interpretation in R.
v. L. (S.J.),65 that together support Professor Bala‟s concept of the
“constitutionalization of adolescence”.66
Child rights advocates should be wary lest this classification of
adolescents as “other” lead to the erosion of their entitlement to other
rights under the Charter. As Binnie J. notes in his dissenting opinion,
“the rights under s. 2(a) of the Charter (religious freedom) and s. 7
(liberty and security of the person) are given to everyone, including
individuals under 16 years old”.67 This tendency is clear in the Court‟s
interpretation of the enumerated ground of age under section 15 of the
Charter in both Canadian Foundation, where the presumed different
capacities of younger children led to the conclusion that the law that
excuses assaults on them does not infringe their right to equality, and in
C. (A.) v. Manitoba, where the majority of the Court found no such
infringement because the legislation required a determination of their
best interests which permits them to demonstrate their maturity.
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